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5. In addition to these two southwestern regimes, there are the two northwestern provinces of Chinghai and Ninghsia presided over by the Moslem cousins Ma, who claim to be powerful enough to maintain their regimes against the Communists and probably to expand their area to include Western Kansu.

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6.

7. How long such semi-autonomous provincial regimes can survive will depend naturally on the degree of success which the Communists achieve in digesting the areas they have overrun and in solving the administrative and economic problems which they have thereby acquired.

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8.

an almost unanimous reaction is that the country's economy cannot support the burden of military expenditure on the existing scale; that as the Nationalists are unable to overcome the Communists, there is no alternative to accepting the Communist regime; and that it then remains to be seen if the Communists will abandon military adventures and concentrate on economic reconstruction. If they do and are successful the Chinese public is willing to accept them; if they do not. or fail in their endeavor, a further upheaval will follow.

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But

an intense war weariness and a desire to see the end of armies is apparent everywhere.

- 9. Individual civil servants, especially those in minor positions, are prepared to continue to function under the Communists for as long as the Communists will employ them. This applies to Chinese educated abroad as well as those without any foreign background.
- 10. The non-Communist Chinese reaction to the prospect of Communist control is commonly summed up by the remark, "There is no way of dealing (with it)", i.e. there is nothing which can be done and, therefore, it must be accepted.

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